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Abstract 15 
Research has shown that the media are the main source of information and the main factor 16 
shaping people’s awareness and concern in relation to climate change and therefore have an 17 
important role in setting the public agenda. As a key forum for the production, reproduction and 18 
transformation of the meaning of public issues, the media influence understandings of risks, 19 
responsibilities, as well as of the functioning of democratic politics. This article argues that the 20 
media also matter to citizens’ perception of their (potential) political agency or their political 21 
subjectivity. Media representations construct particular ‘subject positions’ for individuals and 22 
cultivate dispositions to action or inaction. The article discusses the importance of citizens’ 23 
political engagement with climate change and points out some aspects of media(ted) discourses 24 
that may constrain the perceived possibilities of participation in the politics of climate change. 25 
While engagement with climate change has multiple dimensions and a number of barriers have 26 
been identified through empirical studies, this article offers a critique of the role of the media in 27 
political engagement with the problem and suggests avenues for future research. 28 
 29 
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The media are both important arenas and important agents in the production, reproduction 1 
and transformation of the meanings of social issues. The particular discourses that they amplify 2 
strongly affect the social construction of problems and of ‘authorized voices’. Therefore, 3 
media(ted) discourses play key roles in social life as they are both conditions of intelligibility of the 4 
world and conditions of possibility of action upon it [1] .  5 
Research has shown that the media have an important influence over people’s perceptions of 6 
the ‘distant’ and unobtrusive issue of climate change [2, 3, 4]. Access to scientific information, 7 
political arguments and even ethical debates on this matter depends on the media(ted) 8 
discourses citizens’ consume. Media coverage has been a key factor in raising levels of 9 
awareness and concern in the last decade or so [5]. Representations of the problem in the media 10 
are also likely to have influenced citizens’ understanding of both the risks associated to climate 11 
change and the responsibilities in addressing the problem. Moreover, the social credibility and 12 
social authority of different social actors, their claims and arguments, are also largely defined by 13 
discursive exchanges taking place in the media [6, 7]. 14 
There are complex and dynamic connections between social practices and mediated textual 15 
practices. The processes of production and consumption of media discourse can be usefully 16 
understood as a series of cultural circuits where both encoding and decoding (i.e. how 17 
interpretations of the world are built into and read from signs) interact and co-evolve with political, 18 
economic and regulatory frameworks, and where the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheresi intersect [8] 19 
Personal meaning-making draws both on media(ted) discourses and on lived experiences and 20 
social relations. 21 
Political possibilities are conditioned by discursive constructions that are dominant (or felt as 22 
such) in a particular historical-cultural context. At a more fundamental level, so is the perception 23 
of one’s own (potential) political roles and capacity. This article examines the relation between 24 
citizens’ discursively constructed political subjectivity and the possibilities of participation in the 25 
politics of climate change. While engagement with climate change has multiple dimensions and a 26 
number of barriers have been identified through empirical studies [9], this article offers a critique 27 
of the role of the media in political engagement with the problem and suggests avenues for future 28 
research. 29 
The case for political engagement on climate change 30 
There can hardly be an issue more eminently political than climate change. It depends on 31 
decisions regarding collective matters, such as transport and energy, and the choices that are 32 
made have crucial implications for all living individuals, as well as unborn ones, both within and 33 
beyond national borders. Crucially, climate change also broadens the political field insofar as it 34 
transforms realities previously perceived as private and a-political, such as car use, into 35 
contentious options of collective significance. The policy and regulatory transformations that are 36 
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needed to effectively address the problem are far-reaching and political systems are unlikely to 1 
put them in place without a sustained display of public support (if not demand) [10]. Moreover, 2 
appropriate responses to climate change require the reconciliation of a variety of value-informed 3 
claims and interests. The only arrangements that may be viable in the long run are those that 4 
accommodate a diversity of positions or, in other words, that are equitable and fair. The voices 5 
and arguments that get to be heard and that get to be incorporated in policy decisions are key for 6 
the future of climate change.  7 
In the last two decades, a number of scholars have promoted a wider participation of the 8 
public in science-related debates and decisions as a source of increased legitimacy, a basis of 9 
accountability and a guarantee of social and ethical relevance [11, 12]. Studies of citizen juries, 10 
citizen advisory boards, consensus conferences and other mechanisms of public participation 11 
indicate that valuable insight can be gained from involving citizens in decision-making [13]. 12 
Nevertheless, those mechanisms have so far had a limited impact in political life. These (typically) 13 
top-down exercises have in some cases been criticized for remaining closed-off to citizens as 14 
many aspects of decision-making continue to be constructed as ‘technical’ and ‘non-political’ and 15 
because citizens’ views have had little, if any, consequences on the expert/political bodies [14, 16 
15]. Furthermore, despite official commitments to promoting public participation in responding to 17 
climate change, there is evidence that governments' understanding of citizen engagement is 18 
mainly instrumental and based on a narrow conception of participatory democracy [16]. 19 
While institutional spaces with citizen participation are important and there is ongoing interest 20 
in the design of new forums to integrate citizens, experts and various stakeholders [17], the idea 21 
of political participation that is adopted in this article overflows those formal arenas. The 22 
boundaries of ‘the political’ are here not delimited by institutionalized politics or government but 23 
stretch to include all forms of (discursive) action on collective problems taking place in public 24 
spacesii. Such action can take the form of a demonstration, an article in a newspaper or an online 25 
petition, any of which may serve to critique a political option, mobilize others for change or 26 
otherwise challenge power structures. These forms of informal political participation and citizen 27 
mobilization can be an important factor in political decision-making and could influence national 28 
and international policies on climate change. Political engagement of citizens could not only force 29 
governments to act but also improve the quality of the decisions as well as their acceptabilityiii. 30 
There are multiple indications that citizen engagement with the politics of climate change is 31 
quite low [2, 10]. What objective and/or subjective conditions may explain this? A survey of over 32 
two thousand people recently conducted in the US by Yale and George Mason Universities 33 
provides some interesting cues into people’s relation to climate change politics. One of the 34 
questions aimed to assess levels of political activism, conceptualized as the act of having ‘written 35 
letters, emailed, or phoned government officials to urge them to take action to reduce global 36 
warming’ in the previous year [Reference 18, p. 23]. 8% of respondents declared that they had 37 
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done so although with different frequencies (from once to ‘many times’). People were also asked 1 
what ‘reasons might prevent [them] from taking [those] actions’. Out of ten possible answers, ‘I 2 
am not an activist’ was the most chosen one (by 33% of respondents). This is a statement about 3 
a subjective condition: the main declared reason for not engaging in political action is one’s 4 
perceived identity. It is also worth mentioning that 10% of the people chose the option ‘I would 5 
feel uncomfortable’, which may be viewed as a similar motivation. 22% chose the option ‘It 6 
wouldn’t make any difference if I did’, a justification that suggests a sense of political 7 
powerlessnessiv.  8 
Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill have recently examined the reasons for the public’s divorce 9 
from climate politics. Amongst other aspects, they pointed out that Hansard’s latest Audit of 10 
Political Engagement in the UK [19] indicated a ‘lack of political self-efficacy (…): less than one 11 
third of people believe that “when people like me get involved in politics, they can really change 12 
the way the country is run.”’ [Reference 10, p. 318] 13 
The data mentioned above provide a stark picture of people’s sense of their (potential) political 14 
power and of the possibilities for civic action in democratic societies. The first survey suggests 15 
that this may be a central aspect of political disengagement in relation to climate change. 16 
Moreover, it hints at an identitary chasm in relation to civic politics. Evidently, identifying the 17 
reasons of these perceptions is a critical task for social research. This article postulates that it is 18 
worth looking at how those notions may be rooted in the symbolic environment in which current 19 
democratic politics is enacted and at the role of the media therein. In order to do so, it suggests 20 
that it may be productive to draw on – and create bridges between – a variety of theoretical 21 
traditions and research fields, from media and political sociology to postmarxist discourse theory.  22 
Culture of citizenship in a mediated world 23 
The relation between the media and participation in political life has been the subject of much 24 
contestation. Whereas some scholars have hailed the media, old and new, as forces of social 25 
mobilization, which generate political interest and an active citizenry [20, 21, 22] others have 26 
condemned them as the cause of lack of trust in politics, cynicism, political apathy, and alienation 27 
[23, 24, 25]. Empirical studies have given fodder to both the mobilization and the ‘media malaise’ 28 
theses. Some researchers have shown a positive correlation between media consumption and 29 
levels of political talk and participation [26, 27] and a positive effect of the internet in levels of 30 
political information and political participation [28, 29], as well as in the empowerment of 31 
marginalized groups [30]. Others have found evidence that television distances people from 32 
community life and promotes civic disengagement [31]; have claimed that the internet reproduces 33 
differences of power and participation [32]; and that it ‘increasingly encourages the individual to 34 
look for private solutions to the problems of public nature which contributes to the understanding 35 
of citizenship not as a public but predominantly as a private affair.’ [Reference 33, pp. 349]. 36 
Finally, some studies have concluded that attitudinal differences may be associated with 37 
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consumption of specific types of media content (e.g. news or entertainment on television) rather 1 
than with a medium as a whole [34]. 2 
Despite these ambiguities in research, it is undeniable that the media are the main arenas for 3 
citizens’ understanding of political struggles in our times. The notion of ‘mediated citizenship’ [35] 4 
acknowledges the centrality of the media in contemporary public spheres and in the construction 5 
of notions of the ‘citizen’, their rights, their responsibilities and their space for political action. In a 6 
media-saturated environment, perceptions of distribution of power, of the role of individuals in 7 
democracy and of the effectiveness of civic action are a function of multiple discursive 8 
representations that can be accessed via television news, street billboards, blogs, radio talk 9 
shows or mass emails, amongst many other forms. Crucially, media(ted) discourses also 10 
influence people’s view of their own position in the chessboard of politics and are also constitutive 11 
of the political self, cultivating dispositions to action or inaction. 12 
Individual self-recognition as a (potential) political agent therefore relates to one’s (perceived) 13 
symbolic standing. The ‘political self’ is understood here as an interpretive construct regarding 14 
one’s own position in the political world; it is a crucial dimension of political subjectivity, the 15 
(mediated) experience of politics and associated views and beliefs. Drawing on Laclau and 16 
Mouffe [36], as well as Giddens [37], the view adopted in this article is that political subjectivity 17 
depends on ‘subject positions’ in a discursive structure but that there are also possibilities for 18 
action within that structure. It is produced in the context of particular discourses and a contingent 19 
set of social relations but it is never fully fixed. Therefore it is subject to change and can be 20 
transformed. 21 
Media representations and political subjectivity 22 
What aspects of the media’s representations of the world may hinder, rather than promote, 23 
political engagement? In this part of the article, several problematic issues are outlined. Some 24 
concern specifically climate change but others are of a more general nature as people’s identities 25 
and subjectivities are constructed and reconstructed within the whole (mediated) discursive field. 26 
 27 
Representations of the public’s political (in)capability 28 
Research has shown that the public is often associated in the media with a less-then-rational 29 
approach to social issues. For instance, in their analysis of representations of citizens in 30 
television in the US and Britain, Lewis, Wahl-Jorgensen and Inthorn concluded that the 31 
predominant image is of a passive, reactive and self-interested public. ‘There is a sense here that 32 
ordinary citizens are almost childlike: they have moods, experiences and emotions, but they are 33 
rarely seen making forays into a deliberative public sphere.’ [Reference 38; pp. 160]. 34 
Polls feature frequently in the media and in political discourse as proxies of public opinion and 35 
are used for purposes of directing attention to an issue or position, legitimating a given policy or 36 
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promoting opposition towards a political choice. They are a powerful rhetorical device. Höppner 1 
has analysed representations of polls about climate change in British newspapers and suggested 2 
that the public has often been portrayed as denying of climate change, with apathetic and 3 
hypocritical attitudes towards the problem and as ‘deficient in terms of rationality, reliability, 4 
authenticity, consistency, acceptance, and behaviour’ [Reference 39, p. 14]. In some cases, 5 
interpretations of the actual questions that were asked and of the distributions of answers were 6 
clearly distorted in order to fit a particular value preference. 7 
The media may often be reproducing official discourses regarding public participation. Based 8 
on the analysis of the UK Climate Change Programme, Höppner maintains that ‘citizens are 9 
expected to engage by adopting the ‘right attitude’, by performing prescribed behaviours, and by 10 
consenting to governmental measures’ [Reference 16, p. 1]. 11 
As political agents with positions, ideas and proposals for addressing climate change and 12 
other public matters, citizens have been largely left out of media(ted) discourses. These 13 
exclusionary constructions do not recognize citizens as worthy speakers on the substance of 14 
collective problems and do not cultivate a proactive political identity. New media, such as blogs 15 
and other types of websites, have enabled self- and hetero-representation of citizens in 16 
alternative ways and thereby contributed to diversify this picture [e.g. 40]. More empowering 17 
modes of implicating citizens in discourse are certainly also possible for the mainstream 18 
corporate media. 19 
 20 
The ‘media politics of dissent’ [41]   21 
There is no doubt that social movements have influenced discourses on environmental issues 22 
and others in the last few decades [42], and that the development of new and alternative (non-23 
commercial and typically non-professional) media has significantly enhanced the possibilities of 24 
civic politics. The Global Justice Movement [43] and media projects like Indymedia, The Nation 25 
and Democracy Now! are good examples of how new media, particularly Internet-based ones, 26 
may be used to create framings of global issues that challenge the dominant discourses in the 27 
mainstream corporate media [44; 45]. Often interactive and linked to mobile technologies, these 28 
media can be critical in the enactment of resistance [46]. The recent appearance of a number of 29 
civic initiatives on climate change, such as Rising Tide, Oilwatch, Carbon Rationing Action 30 
Groups, Transition Towns, 350.org and others, suggests that there is scope for critical 31 
engagement in the global politics of climate changev. 32 
Greenpeace is the most media savvy of environmental groups and their communication 33 
strategies have garnered a significant visibility around the world. In some cases, this has 34 
produced successful outcomes for the organization [47]. How this has contributed to the public 35 
understanding of environmental problems and politics is less clear. However, research has long 36 
shown that the relation between social movements and the media can be antagonistic and that 37 
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the journalistic reconstruction of civic action often empties it of its political content [48]. Several 1 
studies have pointed out that challenges to corporate-led globalization are predominantly 2 
portrayed as akin to undesirable social disorder in the mainstream media [49, 50, 51]. The ‘anti-3 
globalization’ movement typically gets a shallow and biasing representation where the ‘violent 4 
protest’ frame is dominant and there is little or no acknowledgement and analysis of the stances 5 
of the movement in relation to key issues like international trade, poverty or environmental 6 
change. Similarly, acts of environmental sabotage, designed to protect nature while not harming 7 
humans, have increasingly been presented in the news media as ‘ecoterrorism’ [52]. 8 
Cottle [41] has recently argued that the media politics of dissent may be changing not only 9 
because the current media ecology offers more opportunities for independent communication but 10 
also because some ‘old media’ may occasionally engage in the ‘manufacture of dissent’ [53] and 11 
produce more progressive interpretations of civic action. He also cited data from several polls 12 
suggesting a growing public support for demonstrations [Reference 41, p. 857]. Replacing a 13 
culture of conformity, which according to Ivie [54] stigmatizes difference and conflict, with a 14 
culture of dissent may require significant transformations beyond the media. Nonetheless, these 15 
are encouraging signs. 16 
 17 
Political scales and citizen agency 18 
A large part of mainstream media stories about climate change are set in the context of high-19 
profile intergovernmental meetings and advance the notion that the global is the appropriate 20 
political space for action. A study of the volume of print media coverage at a series of key 21 
moments since 1990 in Portugal has shown that the peaks coincided with international summits; 22 
in contrast, key national events, such as the public presentation of the Portuguese Climate 23 
Change Plan in 2001 and the presentation of the Portuguese Plan of Allocation of Emissions 24 
Allowances in 2004, received little media attention. Content analysis and discourse analysis of 25 
articles has also shown a disproportional representation of international politics and that the 26 
media often (implicitly) constituted the global into the appropriate locus of action [55]. Similarly, 27 
Olausson [56] has maintained that mitigation was mainly represented as a transnational 28 
responsibility in Swedish media. Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui’s [5] analysis of newspaper coverage in 29 
Japan made visible that most peaks coincided with high-status international summits (national 30 
events only achieved significant attention when they were associated with media-oriented 31 
campaigns). 32 
While this can partly be expected given the relevance of international negotiations for the 33 
management of climate change, it can also be argued that the national and the local are the right 34 
levels to act. Yet, sustained analysis of the possibilities for local policy-making on climate change 35 
features only rarely in the mainstream media. Hence, while climate change may be represented 36 
as a tragic threat, debate on the climate impacts of a new road or a new housing development 37 
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does not necessarily take place in a meaningful way. There is an apparent disconnect between 1 
climate change and specific sources of greenhouse gas emissions and between the global and 2 
local scales. 3 
It is likely that this has influenced perceptions and ideas about the scale of climate change. 4 
Multiple surveys show that people tend to rank climate change higher as a problem for the world 5 
than as a problem for their own country or region [57, 5]. Furthermore, by constructing climate 6 
change primarily as a global political issue these discourses construct citizen agency as minute. 7 
Citizens are likely to feel powerless to affect processes and decisions at the global level. Such a 8 
setting emphasizes the distance between ordinary citizens and decision-making and reinforces 9 
the image of climate politics as being reserved to the heads of the most powerful states. As the 10 
management of climate change is, in most mediated discourses, the realm of (scientific and 11 
political) elites citizens are constituted into spectators or bystandersvi.  12 
Perceptions of the politics of climate change and of one’s roles therein are also inexorably 13 
intertwined with wider discourses on ‘globalisation’. Policy-makers, international organisations 14 
and – most obviously – corporations have been representing the ‘mobility’ of capital and 15 
production across the world as ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ processes [58]. This construction of 16 
globalisation, which is left unquestioned by many of the mainstream media, omits responsibility 17 
for particular choices and leaves no scope for citizen participation and informed deliberation. 18 
Processes of globalization are of course complex and have many faces. It can be argued that 19 
while globalization means that there is no centre of power to work as a focus of contestation and 20 
resistance, the development of information and communication technologies has greatly 21 
facilitated the constitution of transnational forms of civic organization. Scholars like Szerszynski 22 
[59, 60] and Beck [61] have suggested that the media may contribute to the development of 23 
global or cosmopolitan forms of citizenship. Significant impacts on the politics of climate change 24 
remain to be seen but the development of civic movements mentioned above may suggest that 25 
some transformation is under way.  26 
Closing remarks 27 
Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill have recently argued that fostering social demand for political 28 
regulation could be a useful strategy to respond to climate change but pointed out that various 29 
factors may inhibit it [10]. In a similar line, this article has brought citizens’ political engagement 30 
with climate change to the fore and discussed the role of the media in relation to political 31 
subjectivity. The critical analysis that was done here is by no means exhaustive. Besides the 32 
three aspects that were emphasized, many other factors may constrain people’s sense of political 33 
agency or willingness for political participation, including a widespread disillusion with democratic 34 
politics, media alarmism and the sheer magnitude of climate change in spatial and temporal 35 
terms. Moreover, as Shanahan and McComas [62] have maintained, the wider media(ted) culture 36 
permanently appeals to values like ‘progress’ and materialism, contribute to maintaining the 37 
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status quo and dissuade audiences that they can or should play a role in solving environmental 1 
problems. 2 
The main conclusion of this article is that it is worth investigating the roles of the media in the 3 
processes of political (dis)engagement in relation to climate change, and doing so in light of 4 
diverse theoretical contributions. Future research should focus on the role of new and alternative 5 
media (such as multimodal websites, videocasts and ‘social media’ like Facebook) in the 6 
empowerment and performance of resistance in climate change-related movements. It should 7 
analyse the communicative spaces where new forms of political subjectivity may be developing. It 8 
should probe into new varieties of ‘collective political subjectivity’vii, which are likely to be multi-9 
scalar and flexible [63]. And it should continue to scrutinize the politics of recognition of civic 10 
agents by the mainstream media and implications for climate change. 11 
Notes 12 
*Please note that all endnotes were placed automatically at the end of this 13 
document.* 14 
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i The boundaries of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres are of course changing and often blurred. 
Nonetheless, these concepts help distinguish sites with different degrees of visibility.  
ii Still, this notion does not go as far as some poststructuralist scholarship, which postulates that 
there is ‘no outside’ to politics. 
Political engagement is understood here as involvement in political activity and therefore is 
closely related to political participation, which refers to the actual political intervention. 
iii Some would argue that widening participation on climate decision-making is not necessarily the 
most effective means to produce responses [64]. The view taken here is that despite the 
exceptional character of climate change as an object of political regulation, plural input and space 
for dissent are conditions of sustainability of any decisions in democratic government. As 
suggested by Mouffe [65], rather than the production of consensus, which can never be full or 
fixed, the defining trait of democracy should be the enablement of alternative voices and 
proposals and the creation of fair spaces of negotiation. Dissent can contribute to the 
development of new ideas and more creative possibilities. 
iv Although significant, reported barriers to political activism related to more ‘selfish’ factors, such 
as ‘I’m too busy’ (18%) and ‘It’s too much effort’ (16%), were clearly less important. Finally, the 
option ‘I don’t know how’ gathered 17% of the answers while ‘I don’t think is important’ and ‘I do 
not believe in global warming’ got 10% each. 
v It must be noted, however, that these examples refer mainly to the UK and most do not have a 
parallel in other countries. 
vi This has been corroborated by free word association exercises and by a survey conducted in 
Portugal, which suggested that people view themselves as victims of climate change but not as 
agents of resolution of the problem, and have a very weak political culture concerning climate 
change [66, 2]. 
vii ‘Collective political subjectivity’ is linked to imagined communities of actors organized around a 
common social project. 
